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Stricken by Terror: Seeing and Knowing
in Late Medieval Criminal Case Records
Corinne Wieben
University of Northern Colorado
Medieval legal records frequently feature parties and lawyers willing to stretch

the truth and weave tales that fulfill statutory requirements and promote their
cases, but what happens when defendants testify against themselves? When
Giambono of Matraia, a monk from the monastery of San Ponziano in Lucca,
appeared before Lucca’s episcopal court in 1356, he found himself facing charges
of adultery, robbery, and murder. After four witnesses testified against him,
Giambono confessed. When all seemed lost, Ser Giovanni Folchini, a well-known
Lucchese notary, appeared as Giambono’s legal representative and claimed his
client’s confession was false, since “he said these things while stricken by terror
and fear of torture.” So when is a confession not a confession? How do we tell
the story of a case when we are unsure of its purpose and meaning? This study
explores the medieval legal theory of torture and confession and the politics of
fourteenth-century Lucca, all while seeking to unravel the mystery of Giambono’s
case and, in so doing, to suggest useful analytical strategies for “knowing how to
see” when working with criminal court records.

Historians often see but rarely know.1 Those of us who work in
medieval legal records know that we can always rely on interested
parties and their lawyers to stretch the truth and weave tales that fulfill
statutory requirements, please the court, and promote their cases, but
what happens when defendants testify against themselves? When
Giambono of Matraia, a monk from the monastery of San Ponziano
in Lucca, appeared before Lucca’s episcopal court in 1356, he found
himself the subject of a litany of dire accusations, including theft,
adultery, and murder. After four witnesses testified against him,
Giambono confessed to a plan to rob the monastery, to adultery with
two married women, and to having robbed and murdered a man.
When all seemed lost, Giambono’s legal representative appeared and
1 This research is the result of funding from the University of Northern Colorado Research, Dissemination & Faculty Development program. An earlier version of this paper
was presented at the Rocky Mountain Medieval and Renaissance Association’s 2019 annual conference and the 2019 annual meeting of the Medieval Association of the Midwest.
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claimed the monk’s confession was false, elicited not by guilt but by
torture. The court, unconvinced, condemned Giambono anyway, in
an apparent contravention of the norms governing medieval judicial
torture. So when is a confession not a confession? How do we tell
the story of a case when we are unsure of its purpose and meaning?
Complicating the search for answers is the role medieval judicial
torture has played in depicting the Middle Ages, as Jody Enders puts
it, “as a distant, irrecuperable Other.”2 In part, this study resulted
from my own discomfort with this case. I find the ambiguity of its
details both fascinating and daunting. Ultimately this case raises
more questions than it answers, but it has led me to explore the
medieval legal theory of torture and confession and, consequently,
to a strategy for “knowing how to see” when working with criminal
case records and tortured testimonies in the Middle Ages.
On September 16, 1356 Giambono appeared before Thomas of
Foligno, episcopal vicar general and magistrate of the episcopal
court, in order for the monk to answer a litany of “excesses and
crimes committed and perpetrated by him.”3 According to the record,
on the first of August Giambono, “having put off his monk’s habit,
assumed the dress of secular servants and of impetuous and dissolute
men, and in such attire he remained for many days and nights in
the house of Angiolino, a gardener from San Ponziano who lived
next to the monastery.”4 So far, the charges seem innocent enough
and typical of some late medieval monks and clerics who attempted
a break from the strictures of ecclesiastical life by temporarily
assuming secular guise.5 However, according to the record, while
Giambono was staying with the gardener, he armed himself “in the
manner of a thief in order to kill his lord father abbot, Gerardo.”6
When the abbot failed to leave the monastery after Giambono had
2 Enders, The Medieval Theater of Cruelty, 21.
3 Archivio Storico Diocesano di Lucca (ASDLu), f. 162 recto.
4 ASDLu, f. 162 recto.
5 Cullum, “Clergy,” 184–86 and 194–95.
6 ASDLu, f. 162 recto.
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lain in wait for several days, the monk “prompted by a diabolical
spirit…, sent one of his boys [quendam suum ragassinum] to climb
over the monastery wall, enter the monastery, and kill the abbot.”7
However, the record states that Giambono’s plot was foiled when
he was discovered—armed and in secular dress—by two servants,
Duccio di Giovanni and Piero di Ghello, both of Pisa, who had been
sent to the monastery by their master, Friar Antonio, “an inquisitor
of heretical error [inquisitoris heretics pravitatis].”8
After this initial charge of attempted murder, a series of other
accusations appear, including that Giambono had been committing
adultery by having sex with the gardener’s wife, called Divisa, in
the couple’s house for the last year. Almost as an afterthought, the
record continues with a charge of murder, saying that Giambono had
hosted a traveling merchant, killed and robbed him, and disposed
of the body in secret. However, the record fails to assign a name
to the murdered merchant. Finally, the court attacked Giambono’s
character, saying “he professes to be a Benedictine and ought to
lead a praiseworthy and honest life, restrained in his actions and
gestures, a holy man and a good example, but he is a perverter
of the [Benedictine] Rule in all ways, to the peril of his soul and
the scandal of others, and an example of damnation.”9 As proof of
his bad character, the case record states that for the last two years
Giambono had frequented “dishonest” places where he gambled at
dice and consorted with “unsavory and foul persons [scleratis et
turpibus personis].”10
Four witnesses appeared to testify against Giambono: the servants
7 ASDLu, f. 162 recto.
8 Though it shares a name with the infamous Spanish Inquisition and the later Roman
Inquisition, the title of the Pisan inquisitor here indicates that he was probably part of the
Papal Inquisition movement, which began in 1231 under Pope Gregory IX and commissioned various groups of Dominican and Franciscan friars to root out heresy. ASDLu, f.
162 recto.
9 ASDLu, f. 162 verso.
10 ASDLu, f. 162 verso.
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of the Pisan inquisitor, Duccio and Piero, Guillielmo del fu Tolomei
of Camaiore, and Ser Aloysius San Albizelli di Villa of Lucca.
There is no record of the specific testimony of each witness, which
is frustratingly typical of these records. Instead the record states that
the witnesses testified that “the inquest discovered these things.”11
In response to the charges against him, Giambono confessed only
to a plan to steal a gilded vestment [pallium] from the monastery
in order to return it and receive a reward of twelve florins from the
abbot.12 He denied all of the other charges outright.
However, in the same portion of the record that contains this
confession to a lesser crime, Giambono then began to confess to a
series of grave crimes. First, he confessed to multiple thefts from
churches, though he did not give specific details as to the locations,
items, or amounts. He then confessed that “he has often lain with
Divisa” and to adulterous sex with Margarita, a married woman,
from whom he also stole twelve chickens with the help of Francesco,
the abbot’s nephew. Most gravely, he confessed to having murdered
a man in order to steal 125 florins (from which act he received
about 45 lire after a three-way split with his accomplices), though
he neither gave the man’s name nor described the circumstances of
the murder.13 Finally, he confessed to a series of thefts, murders, and
assaults, always without specific detail.14
When all seemed lost, Ser Giovanni Folchini, a well-known
Lucchese notary (his name appears in a multitude of episcopal case
records), appeared as Giambono’s legal representative and presented
several points of argument to exonerate Giambono. First, Folchini
declared that the bishop did not have jurisdiction to try this case,
since Giambono was privileged by his status as a Benedictine monk.
On this point Folchini even invoked the name of the current pope to
11 ASDLu, f. 162 verso.
12 ASDLu, f. 165 recto.
13 ASDLu, f. 165 recto-165 verso.
14 ASDLu, f. 166 recto.
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lend additional weight to this argument.15 Folchini then stated that
Giambono rescinded his confession, claiming it was false, since he
was “saying these things while stricken by terror and fear of torture,
since he had been tortured repeatedly and beyond human endurance
[ultra modum humanum]” and that none of what he confessed was
true.16 Folchini concludes by arguing that the case against Giambono
should be dismissed and only heard by a papal tribunal.17 This attempt
to have Giambono’s case dismissed ultimately failed. According
to a marginal note at the beginning of the case record, the court
condemned Giambono on 15 October to “perpetual incarceration [in
perpetuum carcerem].”18
Punitive incarceration for monks had existed since the early thirteenth
century, and sentences of perpetual incarceration appeared more
frequently by the mid-thirteenth century. Judicial officials tended
to reserve this sentence for violent crimes or crimes of apostasy,
though lesser crimes could and did receive this sentence when the
magistrate felt it was warranted.19 The Council of Béziers in 1246,
for example, decided that perpetual imprisonment was a fitting
punishment for relapsed heretics, fugitives, and those who failed to
answer a court summons and were thus judged contumacious.20 The
principal behind this punishment was separation, both from society
and from the monastic community.21 Thus separated, the convicted
offender could no longer harm or pollute those around him.
15 Though Folchini dropped the name of the current pope, Innocent VI, his hopes were
perhaps misplaced. By 1356, the papacy had spent nearly half a century outside of Italy (after relocating the papal curia to the southern French city of Avignon in 1309) and showed
little interest in intervening in local Italian politics.
16 ASDLu, f. 167 recto.
17 ASDLu, f. 167 recto.
18 ASDLu, f. 162 recto.
19 Cassidy-Welch, Imprisonment, 29-30.
20 Cassidy-Welch, Imprisonment, 60.
21 Cassidy-Welch, Imprisonment, 33.
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Some of the charges brought against Giambono, outlandish as
they may seem, are typical of the charges brought against many
ecclesiastics in the fourteenth century. Parish priests in particular
frequently found themselves subject to accusations of adultery
and assault, as the records of Lucca’s episcopal criminal tribunal
attest.22 Elsewhere I have argued that sexuality and violence were
most frequently associated with secular masculinity and therefore
most expressly forbidden to those who had abandoned the secular
world.23 The sheer number of crimes of which Giambono stood
accused, coupled with an astonishing lack of detail and the absence
of other evidence casts a deep shadow over Giambono’s confession.
However, despite the fact that Giambono’s lawyer argued his
confession was false, coerced by torture or the threat of torture, the
confession appears to have stood, since Giambono was sentenced to
perpetual imprisonment.
But the sentence is not the most striking feature of this case. Rather,
it is the application of torture. For historians, judicial torture often
serves as a microcosm of medieval jurisprudence. Those who
envision medieval Europe as particularly benighted tend to focus on
torture as a synecdochic element of a disordered and violent time.
In his 1866 essay on judicial torture, Henry Charles Lea depicted a
chaotic and violent medieval inquisitorial procedure, which he starkly
contrasted with the rationalism of modern jurisprudence.24 Lea’s
descriptions of the medieval judicial process are as evocative as they
are disparaging, as when he argued medieval inquisitorial procedure
determined the suspect “was to be hunted down and entrapped like
a wild beast, that his guilt was to be assumed, and that the efforts
of his judges were to be directed solely to obtaining against him
sufficient evidence to warrant the extortion of a confession without
allowing him the means of defence.”25
22 Wieben, “Virtù,” 144.
23 Wieben, “Virtù,” 141-144.
24 Lea, “Torture,” 391.
25 Lea, “Torture,” 348.
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Lea’s view went on to heavily influence discussions of medieval
jurisprudence in the early twentieth century. Johan Huizinga,
attempting to understand the cultural moment that produced Van
Eyck and other artists like him, argued for a fifteenth century
defined more by a sense of the past and decay than of the future
and innovation. The title of his first chapter, “The Violent Tenor of
Life” is emblematic of his depiction of medieval life as “so violent
and motley… that it bore the mixed smell of blood and of roses.”26
This excessively violent medieval Europe reappeared in the work
of Michel Foucault, who contrasted the spectacular corporal
punishments of the ancien régime with the rise of imprisonment
in the modern era, imagining medieval Europe as “the country of
tortures, dotted with wheels, gibbets, gallows, pillories.”27 Barbara
Tuchman would later champion these same views, primarily relying
on Froissart’s chronicles with support from Gibbon and Michelet to
imagine a late medieval Europe rife with judicial cruelty. As Tuchman
tells it, “the tortures and punishments of civil justice customarily cut
off hands and ears, racked, burned, flayed, and pulled apart people’s
bodies. In everyday life passersby saw some criminal flogged with
a knotted rope or chained upright in an iron collar. They passed
corpses hanging on the gibbet and decapitated heads and quartered
bodies impaled on stakes on the city walls.”28
The true shift in perspective on medieval judicial torture occurred in
the 1970s and 1980s with the work of John Langbein and Edward
Peters. Like Foucault, Langbein argues with Lea’s narrative that the
abolition of torture in the eighteenth century was due to the influence
of Enlightenment thinkers. Unlike Foucault, however, Langbein
depicts an orderly and rational medieval legal system in which
jurists transitioning from the ordeal to Roman-canon procedure saw
torture as a necessary measure to establish certainty of guilt in cases
of capital crimes. As alternative punishments arose in early modern
26 Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages, 18.
27 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 307.
28 Tuchman, A Distant Mirror, 135.
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Europe, Langbein argues, the need for judicial torture diminished,
making the abrogation of torture a practical matter rather than the
sign of a more enlightened age.29 In his survey of torture in the west,
Peters also identifies the roots of medieval judicial torture in the
need to elicit a confession in order to satisfy the demand for proof.30
In his work on inquisitorial procedure, Peters argues that the alterity
of the Middle Ages allowed modern critics of the medieval church
to create “the myth of The Inquisition … universalized in a series
of great artistic works into an indictment, by a modern world, of an
earlier Europe for its crushing of the human spirit.”31
Most recently, Larissa Tracy has addressed judicial torture in
medieval literature, arguing that contrary to popular imagination,
representations of torture and judicial brutality in high and late
medieval literature did not reflect actual practice. Rather, they
represented satirical, critical, and dissenting views that alleviated
growing cultural anxieties surrounding national identity by relegating
such violent practices to a barbarian “Other,” especially along
borderlands and other cultural peripheries.32 In fact, Tracy finds a
number of dissenting voices criticizing the use of judicial torture in
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.33 In the end, Tracy’s study
finds parallels with our own use of—and discomfort with—torture
in these medieval critiques, though she points out the pervasiveness
of Lea and Tuchman’s violent Middle Ages, as “even now we hear
‘torture’ and think ‘medieval,’ however erroneously.”34
This view of a rational and critical medieval jurisprudence of torture
promoted by Langbein, Peters, and now Tracy is evinced by the
enormous efforts of medieval jurists to regulate the use of torture.
29 Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof.
30 Peters, Torture.
31 Peters, Inquisition, 1.
32 Tracy, Torture and Brutality, 5-7.
33 Tracy, Torture and Brutality, 10.
34 Tracy, Torture and Brutality, 17.
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While the ecclesiastical court of Lucca must have utilized torture in
the fourteenth century, almost no mention of its application appears
in the criminal case records. One reason for this may be that torture
was not considered part of the case proper—it was merely a tool
for eliciting a confession where one was required—and therefore
remained unrecorded. Indeed, it would have gone unrecorded in this
case had Giambono’s lawyer not mentioned it in his efforts to have
the case dismissed.
Another reason might be a certain discomfort with the use of torture
among ecclesiastical authorities. The jurisprudence of torture
developed in thirteenth-century northern Italy as part of the larger
development and dissemination of the Roman-canon legal system.35
The earliest extant city statute with rules on torture is the Liber iuris
civilis urbis Veronae (1228), and a decree of Holy Roman Emperor
Frederick II in 1231 declared that torture should be applied to people
of low status who were under grave suspicion of capital crimes.36
It is essential before going any further to distinguish torture from
punishment: judicial torture is the use of physical coercion in order
to investigate allegations of crime and was never intended to be
punitive.37 Instead, torture served as a further measure of acquiring
knowledge when eyewitness testimony or other evidence proved
insufficient. In contrast to popular depictions of medieval torture
as violent, unjust, and arbitrary, statutory law went to great lengths
to ensure that torture served only to confirm guilt in the presence of
overwhelming evidence or a partial confession. As John Bellamy
has argued, “when medieval men were cruel there was usually a
good reason for it. Rarely were they brutal out of sheer sadism.”38
Medieval jurists attempted, whenever possible, to inject humanity
into the law of torture and prevent its abuse.39
35 Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof, 3.
36 Fiorelli, La tortura, 85-86.
37 Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof, 4.
38 Bellamy, Crime and Public Order, 66.
39 Maffei, Dal reato alla sentenza, 100.
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In his extensive work on the history of judicial torture in premodern
Europe, Langbein finds its roots in the shift from trial by ordeal to
criminal trials adjudicated by ecclesiastical or royal officials after
the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. This shift required communities
to change their thinking about the nature of government and state
authority as human discernment took the place of divine judgment.
As Langbein puts it, “How could men be persuaded to accept the
judgment of professional judges today, when only yesterday the
decision was being remitted to God?”40 The answer was the Romancanon legal system of statutory proofs. In the absence of divine
wisdom, conviction would have to depend on the absolute certainty
of guilt.
According to the system of Roman-canon law that permeated
continental Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the court
could convict only on the basis of testimony from two eyewitnesses.
Circumstantial evidence, even in considerable amounts, was
insufficient for a conviction. One example asserts that even if the
suspect is seen running away from the house of a murdered man
with a bloody dagger in one hand and the victim’s property in the
other, that is only enough evidence to warrant an investigation. In
practice this meant that in the absence of two eyewitnesses only the
defendant’s confession carried enough weight for a conviction.41 This
system worked well in the case of overt crimes, but what of covert
crimes where there were no witnesses? The need for eyewitness
testimony or, barring that, a confession in order to convict a defendant
even in the face of overwhelming circumstantial evidence created
an untenable tension around the desire to bring unrepentant covert
criminals to justice.
This tension opened the door to the use of judicial torture in order
to secure a confession in the absence of sufficient evidence. In order
to employ judicial torture against the defendant, the court needed at
40 Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof, 6.
41 Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof, 4.
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least “half proof.” This could take the form of either one eyewitness
or two pieces of especially damning circumstantial evidence.42
Circumstantial evidence, therefore, did not technically enter into the
question of guilt or innocence but was only relevant to the question
of whether the court should examine the accused under torture or
not.43 The use of torture itself, even when warranted by evidence,
was problematic for many medieval jurists who sought to place
extensive restrictions on the use of torture, mostly to answer moral
concerns. These restrictions included that torture should only be
employed in cases of capital crime—never for petty crimes—and
as a last resort if there was no other means of collecting evidence.
Torture was not to be practiced on immune persons, which could
include pregnant women, minors, the aged infirm, aristocrats, highranking public officials, clergy, physicians, and doctors of law, and
not on Sunday and other principal holy days.44
In terms of the administration of torture, the judge or magistrate
himself must personally order its use and be present to oversee
the questioning. While modes of torture could vary, the most
common worked on the body’s extremities (strappado, the rack,
thumbscrews, legscrews, etc.) in order to reduce the risk of death
or permanent injury. Medieval jurists were well aware of the danger
torture presented in securing justice.45 In line with the use of torture
as a measure of last resort, legal manuals instructed magistrates to
first threaten torture before actually torturing a defendant and to
avoid suggestive questioning that might cast doubt on a confession’s
veracity. Since the purpose of a confession obtained by torture was
to provide sure evidence of guilt, the confession had to appear to
be a true and voluntary admission of guilt. A confession obtained
via torture had to be repeated again freely in court. Freedom was
relative, however, since a retraction or denial of the confession in
court could warrant a second application of torture.46
42 Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof, 5.
43 Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof, 8.
44 Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof, 13.
45 Dean, Crime in Medieval Europe, 16.
46 Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof, 14-15.
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It is difficult to read a case like Giambono’s. It is, of course,
impossible to know what happened outside of the context of the
record itself. All that is really possible to determine in records of
criminal and civil cases is what those testifying said happened. But
how best to approach a case where the defendant insists that he gave
a false confession under torture or the threat of torture and in which
torture may have been applied outside of statutory bounds? Given
the complex nature of Giambono’s confession, it may serve to turn
our attention away from the case record and toward the context of the
case. To that end, I should say a few words about criminal procedure
in late medieval Europe and politics in fourteenth-century Lucca.
Under the system of Roman-canon law that predominated in
continental Europe, criminal proceedings required a formal
denunciation to the court, usually rendered by an aggrieved party,
or that a cursory investigation of a community (during an episcopal
visitation, for example) yield up news that someone had committed
a crime that was public knowledge (publica vox et fama). From
there, the court took over the duties of investigation, seeking out
and questioning witnesses, evaluating circumstantial evidence, and
building a case against the defendant. The first question in a criminal
case and often the first piece of information recorded is the name
of the denouncer. Who was it who first brought the offender to the
court’s attention?
This case record seems to indicate that the ex officio investigation
began not with an individual denunciation but as the result of
Giambono’s general reputation, his fama, within the vicinity of San
Ponziano. After introducing the name of the judge and the source
of his authority—Thomas of Foligno, vicar general of the bishop of
Lucca—the actual details of the case begin with the following: “We,
Thomas of Foligno, the aforementioned vicar, since it recently came
to our hearing and attention and that of our court, not without many
complaints but with notorious and clamorous insinuation, preceding
not from malicious but from suitable and trustworthy persons and
the reports of notorious infamy that too often reached us about
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this man…”47 This construction suggests that the court’s cause to
investigate Giambono originated either as the result of a series of
complaints or after a general inquest in the community. However,
this explanation raises more questions than it answers. How would
the community know about Giambono’s supposed offenses? It
seems unlikely that a monk who was ostensibly cloistered away
within the monastery until at most six weeks prior to the trial had
suddenly become infamous within community at large, especially
since the two local witnesses are listed as residents of Camaiore
and the city of Lucca, respectively, and not residents of the vicinity
of San Ponziano. It seems far more likely that the denunciation
originated with Duccio and Piero, the servants of the inquisitor Friar
Antonio, who just happened to arrive at the monastery in time to
seize Giambono. What were two servants of a Pisan inquisitor doing
investigating a monastery in Lucca in the first place?
It is significant that Friar Antonio was not based in Lucca but
rather in the neighboring city of Pisa, especially in light of the
fraught relationship between Lucca and Pisa in the mid-fourteenth
century. Following the death of the famed Lucchese lord Castruccio
Castracani in 1328, Lucca found itself subject to over four decades
of foreign rule, first by the Holy Roman Emperor Louis IV and a
series of royal vicars, then by the commune of Florence in 1341,
and finally by the commune of Pisa, beginning in 1342 and ending
with the resumption of self-rule in 1369. This means that in 1356,
the year in which Giambono’s case appeared in the episcopal court,
the city of Lucca was still under Pisan rule.
The original terms for Pisan rule of Lucca were relatively lenient.
There would be a fifteen-year league between the two cities; Pisa
would have custody of Lucca’s walls and defenses; Lucca would
be ruled ad comune by the Anziani, Podestà, and other officials,
whom the Lucchesi could elect themselves, provided they were not
enemies of Pisa; Pisa would not interfere directly in government or
financial matters; Pisa would not alienate Lucca or its territories;
47 ASDLu, f. 162 recto.
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and Lucca and its territories would regain independence at the end
of the fifteen-year term. Pisa, however, was too weak to adhere
to this plan and still maintain control of Lucca, and the terms
broke down over time. By September 1342, the Anziani of Lucca
authorized Pisan intervention in government elections, and by
1355, Pisa had obtained an imperial vicariate over Lucca from Holy
Roman Emperor Charles IV and negotiated both another twenty
years of the league and the election of Pisan Anziani as captains
and defenders of Lucca. Even though this was the case, Lucca was
always governed separately, with no attempt at assimilation. Pisa
preferred exercising indirect control over the elections of traditional
offices—the Podestà, Anziani, chancellor and other officials—over
changing established institutions.48
During the period of Pisan rule, the authorities of Pisa repeatedly
attempted to control the election of the bishop of Lucca, but they
were never quite able to gain control of the episcopal office. In
October 1348, just before the death of Bishop Guilielmo II of
Lucca, Pisa tried to secure the appointment of a Pisan bishop in
Lucca, sending embassies to the pope in September and October
1349. They ultimately failed, and the bishop’s death resulted in
the election of Bishop Berengario II of the Biagini family of the
city of Lucca.49 It is significant that Berengario was not from the
surrounding countryside, as Guilielmo was, but was a native son
of the city itself and furthermore a member of one of Lucca’s more
prominent families. Though the bishop of Lucca never really had
the power to challenge the operations of the commune or communal
authority, it is clear that the canons of Lucca were sending a message
to their Pisan overlords: the bishop of Lucca was to be Lucchese.50
Because of this determination, the episcopal court may have been
the last source of public justice in the city that was more or less free
48 Meek, The Commune of Lucca, 17-31.
49 Meek, The Commune of Lucca, 30-31.
50 On the power of the bishop in relation to the urban commune, see Osheim, An Italian
Lordship and Wickham, Courts and Conflict.
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from Pisan political interference. The monastery of San Ponziano,
which lay a mere two hundred meters outside the main eastern
gate of Lucca’s medieval walls, would be a tempting target for a
Pisan inquisitor looking to make inroads into Lucca’s ecclesiastical
community in order to expose scandal there.
The joy and frustration of medieval legal records is that we can see
and still not know. Giambono’s case reminds us of this fact. This
case’s ambiguities, its silences, its lack of detail all leave us in the
dark trying to explain this tantalizing and seemingly exceptional
case. In order to make sense of it, however, it helps to expand our
focus from the details of the case itself to encompass the world
that created it. We cannot know if Giambono committed the
crimes with which he was charged, but we do know why a Pisan
inquisitor might be keen to bring charges against a Lucchese monk
and why the episcopal officials of Lucca—and perhaps even the
monastery of San Ponziano—felt their hands tied on the question
of defending Giambono. Giambono the defendant is an obscure
figure, but Giambono the pawn sheds light on the larger political
chess match between Lucca and Pisa. It makes me uncomfortable to
strip Giambono of his agency and even of his personhood in order
to make him a symbol of late medieval Italian political struggles, but
I would argue that, in the end, this method ensures that we do not
get so swept up in seeing the human drama that we sacrifice the few
things that we can know.
Corinne Wieben is Associate Professor of History at the University of Northern

Colorado. Her most recent publication is “Virtù: Marriage, Gender, and Competing
Masculinities in Fourteenth-Century Lucca,” in Rivalrous Masculinities:
New Directions in Medieval Gender Studies, edited by Ann Marie Rasmussen.
Dr. Wieben is currently completing her first monograph, A Kind of Marriage:
Marriage, Gender, and Competing Masculinities in Fourteenth-Century Lucca.
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